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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's recent Twombly decision has tightened pleading standards by retiring
Conley v. Gibson's "no set of facts" language. While Twombly has been applied beyond
antitrust law, its impact on patent pleadings is not yet settled. Currently, a troubling
dichotomy has emerged: lower courts are holding defendants to a heightened pleading
standard for affirmative defenses and counterclaims, while allowing plaintiffs to continue the
pre-Twombly "bare-bones" pleadings practice.
This dichotomy is inconsistent with the
Twombly Court's goal of controlling the ballooning size of and costs of complex civil litigation.
Holding patent plaintiffs to a heightened pleading standard would be at most a negligible
added burden in light of Rule ll's pre-filing investigation requirement, and level the playing
field by allowing defendants to better formulate specific defense theories.
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THE UNEVEN APPLICATION OF TWOMBLYIN PATENT CASES: AN
ARGUMENT FOR LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD
R. DAVID DONOGHUE*

INTRODUCTION

For the past several decades, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) was
understood to require only bare-bones pleading, or "a short and plain statement of
the claim[s]."1
Litigants in patent cases became masters at the art of no-frills
pleading. 2 Plaintiffs asserting patent infringement routinely filed complaints that
simply laid out jurisdiction and venue, identified a patent, claimed a sufficient
3
ownership interest in the patent, and claimed that defendant infringed the patent.
Some complaints identified specific products, but most complaints only listed
examples with open-ended language. 4
In response, defendants typically filed
answers that consisted of plain statements of affirmative defenses and counterclaims,
without any support or detail.5
Sometimes even inequitable conduct was pled
6
without specificity.

* R. David Donoghue is a partner with Holland & Knight LLP focusing his practice on
intellectual property litigation and licensing, and in particular patent litigation. Mr. Donoghue is
also the author of the Chicago IP Litigation Blog, which tracks IP litigation cases in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Donoghue received his J.D. from
Georgetown University Law Center in 1999, and has taught as an adjunct professor at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Donoghue,
and not necessarily of Holland & Knight LLP or any of their respective clients.
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly, The Federa]Rules of Civi] Procedure
and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 877-78 (2008); Richard J.R. Raleigh Jr. & Marcus A.
Huff, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A Review of the "Plausibility"
PleadingStandard,FED. LAW.,
September 2008, at 32, 32.
2 See Home & Nature Inc. v. Sherman Specialty Co., 322 F. Supp. 2d 260, 265-66 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
3 See, e.g., Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 792-94 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's dismissal which required the plaintiff patentee to "express
allegations of infringement of each claim element").
4See, e.g., Cordance Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-45 (D. Del. 2007)
(rejecting argument that defendant's counterclaim was deficient for failing to specifically name the
plaintiffs accused product); Yates Foil U.S.A., Inc. v. Jljin Group, No. 05-3902 (RMB), 2007 WL
2746849, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2007) (denying accused infringer's motion to dismiss a patent
infringement claim on the basis that the patentee failed to indentify allegedly infringing products).
See, e.g., Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Theglobe.com, Inc. 233 F.R.D. 615, 618-19 (D. Kan. 2006)
(striking affirmative defense and counterclaim from pleading for lack of detail).
6 See, e.g., Schwarzkopf Techs. Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 820 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D.
Del. 1992) (holding that pleadings which specified "the name of the German patent which
Schwarzkopf allegedly failed to disclose" satisfied FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b)). "The Federal Circuit has not
ruled on whether Rule 8(a) or Rule 9(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] applies to
allegations of inequitable conduct." David Hricik, Wrong About Everything: The Application by the
District Courts ofRule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 895 n.1 (2003) (quoting
Agere Sys. Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 726, 733-34 (D. Del. 2002)).
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Thus, for years, both plaintiffs and defendants practiced minimalist pleading in
relatively equal measure. As a result, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss patent claims
were virtually nonexistent. 7 But that practice is changing.
The Supreme Court readjusted the playing field when addressing pleading
standards in a complex antitrust case. In BellAtlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8 the Court
held:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
cgrounds" of his "entitlement] to relief' requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).9
In the eighteen months since Twombly came down, district and appellate courts
have applied Twombly beyond antitrust law to almost every area of substantive
law.1 0
The courts are split, however, on the precise impact that Twombly has on
pleadings in patent cases.11 An unsettling dichotomy has emerged: lower courts are
holding defendants to a heightened pleading standard for affirmative defenses and
counterclaims, while allowing plaintiffs to continue the pre-Twomhly "bare-bones"
pleadings practice. 12 Whereas the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants
was fairly and predictably level before Twombly, the uneven application of Twombly

7 6 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 39:32 (2008) ("The motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Granting such a
motion 'isa precarious disposition with a high mortality rate."' (quoting Syntellect Tech. Corp. v.
Brooktrout Tech., Inc., No. 3:96CV2789G, 1997 WL 419586, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 1997))).
8 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
9Id. at 1964-65 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (citations and footnote omitted).
10See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776-83 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title
VII retaliation); Fastrip, Inc. v. CSX Corp., No. 3:07CV-66-S, 2007 WL 2254357, at *1-2 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 2, 2007) (property damage); Holloway v. Ameristar Casino St. Charles, Inc., No. 4:07 CV 218
DDN, 2007 WL 2199566, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2007) (violations of § 1983); Motino v. Toys "R"
Us, Inc., No. 06-370 (SRC), 2007 WL 2123698, at *1-5 (D.N.J. July 19, 2007) (immigration law
violations); Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1122-28 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Steelman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV. S-062746 LKK/GGH, 2007 WL 2009805, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2007) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act violations); Lutz v. United States, No. 06-1177 (RMC), 2007 WL 1954438, at *2-4
(D.D.C. July 5, 2007) (exhaustion of administrative remedies for tax code violations); Aktieselskabet
AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-19 (D.D.C. 2007), aYd in part,
rev'd in part, 525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (misrepresentation of intention to use trademark in PTO
trademark application).
11Dion Messer, An Overview of Twombly on Patent Pleading Disputes, PAT. STRATEGY &
MGMT., May 2008, at 1, 1-2, 6.
12 See,
e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620, 621-22
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dismissing bare counterclaims and affirmative defenses while allowing patent
infringement claims that identify accused products but nothing else).
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by lower courts has tilted that playing field decidedly in favor of plaintiffs. 13 The
potential implications for patent litigants and practitioners are significant.
This cannot be right. It certainly is not a good outcome for the legal process or
for the interests of justice. Pleading standards are an important and powerful tool
for streamlining litigation and litigation costs, as the Supreme Court recognized in
Twomb]y.14 But changing the standards for defendants alone will not significantly
reduce litigation size or cost because the scope of the plaintiffs case is the chief driver
of the size of litigation. 15 Increasing pleading standards for one side of a litigation
while maintaining it for the other side is neither equitable nor sensible. 16 Patent
pleadings should be held to the heightened Twomb]y standards,as some courts began
doing even before Twombly, 17 but the standards must be consistent for both claims
and defenses. That is the only way to meet the Twombly court's goal of controlling
the ballooning size and costs of complex civil litigation.18
Holding plaintiffs to a heightened pleading standard will not substantially
increase a patent plaintiffs pre-filing burden.1 9 After all, Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure already requires plaintiffs to perform a pre-filing
investigation that includes a comparison of the accused products to the patent's
claims. 2 0
A heightened pleading requirement would require only a marginal
additional burden on plaintiffs; a plaintiff would be required to identify the
particular claims that they accuse defendant of infringing. 21 This negligible added
burden, which some courts already require, 22 would both streamline cases and enable
defendants to answer complaints with more detailed factual defenses and
23
counterclaims.
Without a precise identification of asserted claims, courts can hardly expect
defendants to provide any meaningful detail as to their noninfringement and

13

See Yekaterina Korostash, PleadingStandards in PatentLitigationAfter Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly,

INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST,

Jan. 2008, at 1, 7-8.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966-67 (2007).
15 See Alan H. MacPherson, Discovery and Motion Practice in Patent Litigation, in PATENT
LITIGATION 1992, at 273, 317-21 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. 349, 1992), available atWL, 349 PLI/Pat 273.
16See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 7, § 39:1 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 347 (2005)).
17See, e.g., id.
18 See Int'l Norcent Tech. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., No. CV 07-00043 MMM (SSx),
2007 WL 4976364, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007); Korostash, supra note 13, at 7.
19See Matthews, supra note 7, § 39:1 (citing Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. at 347).
20 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring a party to conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry showing
that "the factual contentions have evidentiary support"); Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275
F.3d 1066, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("As applied by this court, Rule 11 requires an attorney who files a
patent infringement action to compare the accused device with the construed patent claims.").
21 See, e.g., Taurus IP, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wis. 2008)
(applying a heightened pleading standard for patent claims without citation to Twombly).
22 See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 7, § 39:1.
23 See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(illustrating detailed noninfringement and invalidity theories in a declaratory judgment lawsuit
resulting from the patentee's detailed disclosure of specific patent claims that were allegedly
infringed and thorough reverse engineering reports of the plaintiffs products during failed licensing
negotiations).
'4
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invalidity defenses, without any idea as to which claims are at issue. 24 A defendant
cannot effectively argue that a claim is invalid when he does not know which claims
are asserted. 25 The problem is exacerbated given the short timetable with which
defendants are required to answer-under the rules, a defendant must file an answer
26
within twenty days of being served with the complaint, sixty if service is waived.
Part I of this article surveys the pre-Twombly notice pleading standards as
applied to patent cases. Part II analyzes the Twombly decision and the Court's
reasoning. Part III looks at significant Federal Circuit and district court decisions
that have applied Twomblyto raise pleading standards for affirmative defenses while
maintaining the status quo for complaints. Part IV argues that the courts should
apply Twombly in such a way as to restore the balance between plaintiffs' and
defendants' pleading burdens by: (1) adopting, as many district courts already have,
local rules requiring plaintiffs to disclose their infringement positions early in the
case; and (2) requiring a more stringent pleading for patent claims and affirmative
defenses.

I. PRE- TWOMBLYPLEADING HISTORY
Modern pleading standards grew out of the British system. 27 In the original
American system, as in the British system, common law pleading was a highly
technical process that involved multiple rounds of pleadings designed to whittle down
a case to a few issues of law or fact. 28 The system was designed to narrow the issues
and reduce costs, but in practice, it became an "excruciatingly slow, expensive, and
unworkable" system. 29 Not only was this system slow, but it also tended to reward
the more competent technical pleader, regardless of the merits of the underlying
30
action.
In the mid-nineteenth century, state legislatures began replacing common law
pleading with code pleading. 31 Code pleading, such as New York's "Field Code,"
replaced the technical pleading requirement with a requirement to plead operative
facts.3 2 Legal conclusions and evidential facts were not to be pled. 33 As a practical
24 Cf Korostash, supra note 13, at 7 (suggesting that providing only enough detail in a
complaint to allow the defendant's answer to meet the notice pleading required to survive a motion
to dismiss without disclosing which claims are at issue will not allow the defendant to provide any
meaningful detail as to his noninfringement and invalidity defense).
25 Id.

26 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A); see also Ricoh Co. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d.
954, 959 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (explaining "plaintiff must provide notice of its claim so that the other

side may prepare a defense").
27 Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1975-76 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 9

W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 324-27 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1926)).
28 See Ettie Ward, The Afte-r-Shocks of Twombly Will We "Notice" PleadingChanges 82 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 896 (2008).
29 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT

& ARTHUR

R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202

(3d ed. 2004).
30 Jd
31

See, e.g., JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 174

(5th ed. 1887).
32

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

3 Id.
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matter, however, the distinction between operative facts, evidential facts, and legal
conclusions often was difficult to make. 4 As a result, code pleading, just like its
common law predecessor, became immensely technical and expensive. 35 And just as
with common law pleading, code pleading tended to reward the best technical pleader
36
regardless of the merits.
In the 1930s, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) was drafted as a response to
the problems of code pleadings. It was intended to restore the parties' and the court's
focus to the merits of the case.3 7 Rule 8(a) deemphasized technical requirements in
favor of simplicity.3 8 In place of the operative fact requirements, Rule 8 required
straightforward notice pleading: "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief."3 9 Rule 8(a) was designed to facilitate early
resolution of disputes using the discovery system and ultimately trial, as opposed to
forcing litigants out of the system through successive pleadings. 40 The drafters
believed-in hindsight, naively-that it would be faster, less expensive, and more
efficient for parties to resolve disputes using discovery rather than through several
41
rounds of technical pleading.
The Supreme Court solidified the Rule 8 pleading standards in Conley v.
Gibson.42 Until Twombly, Conley served as the cornerstone of pleading requirements
and Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. 43 In Conley, the Court held that a motion to
dismiss must be denied unless "no set of facts" would entitle plaintiff to relief:
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the
accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
44
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
In the patent context, Conley and Rule 8(a) set a low bar for a plaintiff patent
holder. 45 Under the Conley and Rule 8(a) framework, a patent holder need only:
1. identify a defendant;
2. plead ownership of a patent or a sufficient interest in the patent;
3. plead infringement of the patent by defendant; and
46
4. perhaps identify some of the allegedly infringing products or services.
34Id.
35 Morgan Cloud, The 2000 Amendments to the FederalDiscovery Rules and the Future of

Advearsarial Pretrial Litigation, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 27, 52 (2001).
'36See id.
37 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1976.
38 Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supranote 29 § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)).
'3 FED. R. CIV.P. 8(a).
40 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,
534 U. S. 506, 514 (2002)).
41See id.
42 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
43Ward, supra note 28, at 893-919; see also Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1969 (stating that Conlefys
language has "earned its retirement" and is "best forgotten").
44 Conley,355 U.S. at 45-46.
45See Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Motorcycle Info. Network, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174-75
(M.D.Fla. 2005).
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But as every practitioner knows, a patent case does not take shape based on the
complaint. The bare assertion of a patent, with nothing more, sheds little light on
what the case is about. The question of patent infringement
is determined by
comparing the accused products to specific patent claims. 47 Often, neither party has
any insight as to the true scope of the case until discovery is well under way. 48 This
is a problem because discovery quickly can become enormously and prohibitively
expensive in a patent case, particularly where one party is a large corporation with a
substantial amount of electronically stored information. 49 And of course once a party
is forced to expend significant resources on discovery, settlement becomes much more
50
expensive and unlikely.
The modern reality of increasingly discovery-intensive and expensive civil
51
litigation provides the backdrop for the Supreme Court's Twombly decision.
52
Twomhly naturally focused on the complexity and expense of antitrust litigation.
But patent cases are equally complex and expensive. 53
Corporate defendants
routinely spend hundreds of thousands of dollars collecting and analyzing documents
just to respond to document requests in the beginning of a case. 54 It is the rare
patent case that settles or is otherwise resolved before the corporate defendant must
55
go through this exercise.

II. TWOMBLY
In Twombly, the Supreme Court considered the Rule 8(a)(2) requirement that a
pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief' in antitrust action. 56 The Court held that Federal Rule 8 is
intended to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." 57 The Court then found:
46 See FED.

R. Civ. P. app. form 18 (illustrating a patent infringement complaint).

47 Cybor Corp. v. Fas Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

See MacPherson, supra note 15, at 277-81.
hd
50 Jeffrey T. Zachmann, Controlling the Cost of Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes:
Proactive Strategies to Enforce and Defend IntellectualPropertyRights & Contain Litigation Costs,
48
49

in 14TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 387, 404 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,

Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 947, 2008), available at WL, 947
PLI/Pat 387.
51 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
52 Id. at 1967 (noting that one cannot "forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be
expensive").
5 MacPherson, supra note 15, at 277-79.
51See Ben Katzenellenbogen, Trends in Patent Litigation, in PATENT LAW INSTITUTE 2007:
THE IMPACT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON YOUR PRACTICE, at 275, 281-82 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 899, 2007), available at
WL, 899 PLI/Pat 275.
55 See Douglas R. Nemec & Hope S. Yates, Discovery Issues in Patent Litigation:Making the
Most of the Federal Rules, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 573, 579 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 948, 2008), available at WL, 948
PLI/Pat 573.
56 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).
57 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
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While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the
"grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).58
While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the
cumbersome requirement that a claimant "set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim," Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a "showing," rather
than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy
the requirement of providing not only "fair notice" of the nature of the
59
claim, but also "grounds" on which the claim rests.
The Court further explained that it was "retir[ing]" the well-worn Conley
proclamation that a claim would not be dismissed unless the plaintiff could "prove no
set of facts" supporting his claims. 6 0 The Twombly Court specifically rejected this
language:
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted
pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be
supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
61
complaint.
In place of the "no set of facts" standard, the Court held that Rule 8 requires
claims stating a "plausible entitlement to relief."62 Claims that do not make a
"plausible" claim to relief should "be exposed at the point of minim um expenditure of
63
time and money by the partiesand the court."
Twombly involved a section 1 Sherman Act complaint and the Court remained
silent as to whether the new standard applied to other areas of law beyond
antitrust. 64 But Twombly has grabbed the attention of the federal bench and bar:
district and appellate courts have begun to apply Twombly across just about all areas
of law, 65 and a variety of commentators are beginning to write about it.66

5o8Id.

at 1964-65 (citations and footnote omitted).

59 Id. at 1965 n.3 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 1969.
(31Id.
G2 Id. at 1967.
63 Id. at 1966 (emphasis added) (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 29, § 1216).
(34Korostash, supra note 13, at 1, 6.
(5 Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(B)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2008).
(36Soo, e.g., Ward, supra note 28, at 897-98; Amber A. Pelot, Casenote, Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly: Mere Adjustment or StringentNew Requirement in Ploacing, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1371

(2008).
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Courts have applied Twombly to actions as diverse as Title VII, property
damages, section 1983 actions, immigration law, common law torts, ERISA, and
misrepresentations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office during
67
trademark prosecution.

III. TWOMBLYAPPLIED To PATENT CASES
As of the time of this writing, the Federal Circuit has addressed this issue only
once. 68 In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,69 the Federal Circuit held that Twombly

did not alter the Rule 8 pleading standards for patent infringement claims brought
by a pro se plaintiff. 0 Pro se plaintiff McZeal accused a Sprint Nextel phone of
infringing his patent. 71 At the district court's prompting, Sprint Nextel orally moved
to dismiss McZeal's complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).72 The
district court granted the motion and refused McZeal's request to file an amended
complaint. 73 The district court explained that the complaint was irreparable because
there were no set of facts to support it.74
Before ruling on the sufficiency of McZeal's complaint, the Federal Circuit
analyzed the Supreme Court decisions that allow courts to provide pro se litigants
leeway in procedural matters. 75 The Federal Circuit then held that pro se plaintiff
McZeal was entitled to such leniency and that he met the Rule 8 pleading standards,
even under Twombly, because he pled ownership of a patent and he pled that a
specific Sprint Nextel telephone infringed that patent. 76 The Court reasoned that
McZeal did not need to plead each element of each claim of the patents. 77 Despite the
MeZeal decision, it is a relatively small step, and a reasonable one based upon the
Twombly Court's reasoning, to see that the post- Twombly pleading standard should
67 See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776-83 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title
VII retaliation); Fastrip, Inc. v. CSX Corp., No. 3:07CV66S, 2007 WL 2254357, at *1-2 (W.D. Ky.
Aug. 2, 2007) (property damage); Holloway v. Ameristar Casino St. Charles, Inc., No. 4:07 CV 218
DDN, 2007 WL 2199566, at *4-5 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2007) (violations of § 1983); Motino v. Toys "R"
Us, Inc., No. 06-370 (SRC), 2007 WL 2123698, at *1-5 (D.N.J. July 19, 2007) (immigration law
violations); Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1122-28 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress); Steelman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. CIV. S06
2746 LKK/GGH, 2007 WL 2009805, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2007) (Employee Retirement Income
Security Act violations); Lutz v. United States, No. 06-1177 (RMC), 2007 WL 1954438, at *2-4
(D.D.C. July 5, 2007) (exhaustion of administrative remedies for tax code violations); Aktieselskabet
AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15-19 (D.D.C. 2007), affd in pa-rt,
rev'd in part,525 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (misrepresentation of intention to use trademark in PTO
trademark application).
(38McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter MeZea]IA.
69 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
70 Id. at 1356-57, 1356 n.4.
71 McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. H-06-1775, 2006 WL 4792779, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 20,
2006) [hereinafter MeZeal 1], vacated, 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see MeZeal If 501 F.3d at
1357.
72 McZea 1, 2006 WL 4792779, at * 1; see MeZeal 11, 501 F. 3d at 1355.
73
McZea], 2006 WL 4792779, at *1; see McZea]I, 501 F.3d at 1355.
74 McZeal1 2006 WL 4792779, at * 1; see MeZeal 11, 501 F. 3d at 1355.
75 MeZeal]I, 501 F.3d at 1356-57.
76 Id. at 1357.
77 Id.

[8:1 2008]

The Uneven Application of Twomhlyin Patent Cases

require a plaintiff to plead infringement of specific patent claims by specific accused
products.
Without strong Federal Circuit guidance, district courts have been scattered in
their application of Twomhly to patent cases. 7 8 Generally, courts are adopting the
Federal Circuit's MeZealreasoning, often citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Form
18, 79 and holding that a plaintiff is only required to plead sufficient interest in the
patent, the defendant's identity, and that a particular product or service, or category
80
of products or services, infringes the patent.
At least one court has limited Twomblfs reach to antitrust cases. 81 In CBT
Flint Partners,LLC v. Goodmail Systems, Inc.,8 2 the district court reasoned that
Twomily did not require heightened pleading of patent claims. 8 3 The "new
[Twombld standard" was a solution to the high discovery costs in the complex
antitrustlitigationarena, not a broad rewrite of Federal Rule 8:
The Court's "new standard" was merely a specific way to articulate a
solution to what it perceived to be a specific pleading problem, in a specific
area of law that inflicted a high cost upon antitrust defendants. It was not
a broad based new license for federal courts to ramp up pleading
requirements.84
The CBTFlint court reasoned that the problem of expansive, expensive patent
discovery was resolved by the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia's local patent rules requiring early disclosure of infringement
contentions.85 The Northern District of Georgia requires plaintiffs to serve detailed
infringement contentions, including claim charts, within thirty days of filing a joint
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) report, a report that is generally filed within
86
months of a complaint being filed, and sometimes before the complaint is answered.
Similarly, the Northern District of Georgia requires defendants to serve
noninfringement and invalidity contentions within thirty days after receiving
87
plaintiffs infringement contentions.

78 Messer, supra note 11, at 6.
79 FED. R. CIV. P. app. form 18.

80See, e.g., FotoMedia Techs., LLC v. AOL, LLC, No. 2:07CV255, 2008 WL 4135906, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008); PA Advisors, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 2:07-CV-480 (DF), 2008 WL
4136426, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008); CBT Flint Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F.
Supp. 2d 1376, 1379-81 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
SI CBTFlint,529 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
82 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
83 Id. at 1379-80 ("Twombly did not alter pleading standards - especially in the patent
context....").
84 Id. at 1379.
85 Id. at 1380-81; N.D. GA. PATENT L.R. 4.1, 4.4(a), available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/
pdf/NDGARulesPatent.pdf.
86N.D. GA. PATENT L.R. 4.1, 4.4(a), available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/
NDGARulesPatent.pdf.
87 Id. at 4.2, 4.3, 4.4(b).
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But a disturbing trend is emerging. Some courts are applying Twombly to
dismiss the once-standard bare recitations of affirmative defenses, and invalidity and
noninfringement counterclaims.88
All of this suggests a trend of district courts applying Twombly to raise the
pleading standards for defendants, but not plaintiffs. Plaintiffs continue to be
required to meet the old notice pleadings standards-identifying a patent, ownership
of sufficient rights in the patent and defendant's accused products to some level of
specificity. 89 But defendants are held to a higher standard, somewhere between the
old standard and Rule 9 heightened pleading, for affirmative defenses and
counterclaims. 90 Presumably this is Twombly's "plausible" standard. 91
In Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Contour Optik, Inc.,92 for example, the district court
held that it was enough for plaintiff to identify defendant's allegedly infringing
product, and that plaintiff need not identify the specific asserted claims of the
patents in suit. 93 But the district court struck defendant's affirmative defenses,
including an invalidity defense, because those defenses asserted no facts. 94 This
imbalance leads to a nonsensical result-the defendant must articulate detailed, factbased defenses asserting that the patent claims are invalid, without even knowing
which claims he must invalidate. To meet this burden, a conscientious defendant
would be forced to identify prior art against all claims in the asserted patents, all
within twenty days after receiving the complaint (or sixty days if the defendant
waives service). 95 Not only would this lead to a massive waste of resources, it would
give plaintiff an unfair advantage: plaintiff could pick and choose which particular
claims to assert based on the strengths and weaknesses of defendant's prior art case
against each claim. This cannot be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
9 6
sought to streamline litigation and reign in costs.
Plaintiffs should be required at least to identify at the outset of the case the
claims that they intend to assert and the products allegedly infringing each asserted
claim. Plaintiffs are already required to engage in sufficient pre-filing investigations
under Rule 11.97 And plaintiffs control the timing of the suit that they file (with the

88 E.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 620, 621-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2008); Anticancer Inc. v. Xenogen Corp., 248 F.R.D. 278, 282 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Bartronics, Inc. v.
Power-One, Inc., 245 F.R.D. 532, 537 (S.D. Ala. 2007). But see Boldstar Technical, LLC v. Home
Depot, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2007). It appears that Twombly does not impact
inequitable conduct counterclaims because they are subject to Rule 9. See, e.g., Multimedia Patent
Trust v. Microsoft Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1211 (S.D. Cal. 2007); In re Netflix Antitrust Litig.,
506 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316-17 (N.D. Cal. 2007). As a result, this discussion excludes inequitable
conduct counterclaims.
89
Aspex Eyewea-r 531 F. Supp. 2d at 623; see also FED. R. CIV. P. app. form 18 (illustrating a
patent infringement complaint).
90Anticancer,248 F.R.D. at 282.
91Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007).
92 531 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
93Id. at 622.
94Id. at 622-23.
95 FED. R. Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A).

96 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
97 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1073-74 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
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exception, of course, of declaratory judgment actions).98 So at least theoretically,
plaintiffs should be able to take the time to think through their strategy before filing
suit. After all, the clock does not start ticking until the plaintiff decides to start it by
filing suit. Plaintiffs can send potential defendants a notice letter and then have as
long as six years to perform their Rule 11 pre-filing investigation, while defendants
are given either twenty days (with normal service) or sixty days (if they waive
service) to answer a complaint. 99

IV.

EQUALIZING THE EFFECTS OF

TWOMBLY

The Supreme Court cannot have intended this inequitable result. Requiring
defendants to plead defenses with greater detail than plaintiffs' claims is counter to
Twomb]y'% goals of streamlining complex litigation and reducing unnecessary
costs. 100 The better course is to apply the Twombly "plausible" standards equally to
all parties. The costs will be relatively low, but the benefits will be substantial,
including: (1) increased certainty about the merits, leading to a better ability to
quantify outcomes and therefore negotiate settlements; (2) reduced litigation costs;
and (3) a reduction in frivolous cases, or at least in the continued viability of frivolous
cases. These benefits already can be seen in the district courts that have set their
own heightened pleading standards or that have local rules requiring the parties to
submit binding contentions early in the case. 10 1 Cases in these courts tend to proceed
in an orderly and predictable fashion, which not only reduces costs, but also leads to
greater certainty and more meaningful settlement discussions.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, for
example, requires plaintiffs to identify the specific claims that they assert are
infringed and which products allegedly infringe them. 10 2 This relatively minor
additional pleading requirement significantly streamlines cases from their inception
at a relatively low cost to plaintiffs because in order to comply with Rule 11 pre-filing
obligations, plaintiffs should already have done the work of comparing the accused
products to the patent claims. 10 3 And identifying the claims infringed by each

98 FED. R. CIV. P. 3 ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.").

But

see 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006) (providing the United States district courts with declaratory
judgment jurisdiction).

99 FED. R. Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A).

100 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1967 ("[Ilt is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse cannot
be solved by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary judgment stage,' much less 'lucid
instructions to juries;' the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle
even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings." (citation omitted)).
101See, e.g., Cingular Wireless v. Freedom Wireless, Inc, No. CV06-1935 PHX JAT, 2007 WL
1876377, at *6 n.3 (D. Ariz. June 27, 2007) ("While any United States District Court, including this
one, can afford all parties the timeliness, fairness, justice and competence required to resolve their
patent disputes, the Court ispersuaded that the Eastern District of Texas' special rules will most
efficiently promote soundjudicial administration.").
102 Taurus IP, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (explaining
that even with "liberal" Rule 8 standards, "a plaintiff must provide notice of its claim so that the
other side may prepare a defense" (quoting Ricoh Co. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d.
954, 959 (W.D. Wis. 2007))).
103 Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1073-74 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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accused product is equivalent to the heightened pleading standards courts are
10 4
adopting for defendants' affirmative defenses based upon Twombly.
Other courts have streamlined discovery using Local Patent Rules requiring
early, detailed, and binding disclosures of infringement contentions, followed by
10 5
corresponding noninfringement and invalidity contentions in short order.
The most well-known of the Local Patent Rules are those in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. 10 6 The Eastern District of Texas
requires plaintiffs to serve detailed infringement claim charts for each accused
product and claim within ten days of the initial case conference. 10 7 Defendants then
must serve equivalent invalidity charts within forty-five days of receiving plaintiffs
infringement contentions.10 8 These charts become final, unless they are updated
based upon claim construction or with leave of court. 10 9
Local Rules such as these and similar ones in, for example, the Northern District
of Georgia and the Northern District of California narrow cases even more effectively
than Twombly's heightened pleading requirements. 110 But the Twombly pleading
requirements remain a significant and important part of streamlining patent cases,
particularly in those districts that have not adopted local patent rules.
To truly address the concerns the Supreme Court raised in Twombly, it is
critical that district courts, and eventually the Federal Circuit, normalize the effects
of Twombly for plaintiffs and defendants by requiring plaintiffs to identify asserted
claims and accused products in their complaints. As the law stands now, defendants
will be in a twenty or sixty day sprint, depending upon whether they waived service,
from receiving a complaint to answering. 1 This time frame is unrealistic in the vast
majority of patent cases. During those three to eight weeks, a defendant must digest
the complaint, hire counsel, analyze the patent and the alleged infringement, and at
least sketch out a "plausible" set of noninfringement and invalidity defenses, all
while continuing to meet the obligations of defendant's business. That Herculean
104 See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Clariti Eyewear, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 2d 622, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(holding that the plaintiffs complaint that identified a product, claimed ownership of two patents
that the product infringed, and stated that the defendant did not have the right to manufacture or
sell the product was a sufficient pleading for infringement while finding the defendant's similarly
pled counterclaims and affirmative defenses such as obviousness and anticipation to be deficient
under the Twombly standard).
105 See, e.g., E.D. TEX. P.R. 3-1, 3-3, available at
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/Documents/Appendix%/o20M.pdf,
N.D. GA. PATENT
L.R. 4.1-4.4, available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/NDGARulesPatent.pdf, N.D. CAL.
PATENT L.R. 3-1, 3-3, available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Local Rules" hyperlink;
then follow "Patent Local Rules 3/1/2008" hyperlink; then download "Pat3-08.pdf').
106E.D. TEX. P.R., General Order 05-8, available at
http ://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/GeneralOrders/2005/05-8.pdf.
107Id.at 3-1.
108 Id.at 3-3.
10) Id. at 3-6, 3-7.
110
E.D. TEX. P.R. 3-1, 3-3, availableat
ttp://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/Documents/Appendix%/20M.pdf, N.D. GA. PATENT L.R.
4.1-4.4, available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/NDGARulesPatent.pdf; N.D. CAL. PATENT
L.R. 3-1, 3-3, available at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ (follow "Local Rules" hyperlink; then follow
"Patent Local Rules 3/1/2008" hyperlink; then download "Pat3-08.pdf'); see, e.g., CBT Flint
Partners, LLC v. Goodmail Sys., Inc., 529 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1380-81 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
111 FED. R. Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A).
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burden is laughable when compared to plaintiffs freedom to leisurely explore its
potential infringement claims, constrained only by the six year statute of
limitations. 112 That hardly seems equitable.
Additionally, disparate standards will significantly burden the district courtsdistrict courts will face a marked increase in motions to dismiss counterclaims and
motions to strike affirmative defenses. Until accused infringers understand the new,
tilted playing field they are on, plaintiffs will frequently file motions to dismiss
defendants' bare counterclaims and motions to strike bare affirmative defenses.
Such motions to dismiss are fairly rare in patent cases now. The additional drain on
judicial resources and the parties' resources as a result of this increased motion
113
practice will be substantial and unnecessary.
Given the uncertainty of the post- Twombly landscape, litigants and their
counsel should review the pleadings in current cases to make sure they have
sufficiently detailed affirmative defenses and counterclaims on file. For cases that
have already progressed beyond discovery, this may not be an issue. 114 Courts
generally will not dismiss counterclaims or affirmative defenses that have been
factually supported through typical discovery vehicles such as responses to
contention interrogatories. 115 So, it is advisable for those practitioners to doublecheck the pleadings to ensure that their noninfringement and invalidity contention
interrogatories responses are sufficiently detailed and thorough, with ample factual
support.
Changing the standards for defendants alone will not significantly reduce
litigation size or cost, because the scope of the plaintiffs case is the chief driver of the
size of litigation. 11 6 And increasing pleading standards for one side of a litigation
while maintaining it for the other side is neither equitable nor sensible. Patent
pleadings should be held to the heightened Twomb]y standards,as some courts began
doing even before Twombly, but the standards must be consistent for both claims and
defenses. That is the only way to meet the Twombly court's goal of controlling the
117
ballooning size and costs of complex civil litigation within the patent field.

11235 U.S.C. § 286 (2006).
6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY

113 See
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§ 19:2 (2008).
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115 See, e.g., Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. CV-00-20905 RMW, 2007 WL
4062845, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2007) (allowing bare affirmative defenses because it was less
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116 Seo MacPherson, supra note 15.
117 Int'l Norcent Tech. v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs. N.V., No. CV 07-00043 MMM (SSx), 2007
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